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In the early 1960's, a man from Elizabethtown, Ky., was severely
injured in a two-car collision with a Mississippi motorist who was
passing through Elizabethtown. He filed suit and won a default judg-
ment when the defendant failed to appear; however, when plaintiff
attempted to satisfy the judgment by seeking full faith and credit in
Mississippi, he discovered not only that the Mississippian was unin-
sured, but also that, anticipating the Kentuckian's action, he had
secured a divorce with all of his assets passing to his wife. The man
continued to live with his ex-wife and farm his land, but the property
transfer pursuant to the divorce decree effectively insulated the
property from the judgment creditor. Although a victim of the
Mississippian's negligence, the Kentuckian received no compensation
for his disabling injuries.'
To remedy such inequity, Kentucky, following the lead of New
Hampshire and twenty-four other states, enacted a statute in 1966
requiring all automobile insurance companies to provide uninsured
motorist protection in their coverage.2 This protection may be re-
jected in writing by the policyholder s but it must be offered by all
companies underwriting liability coverage in Kentucky.4
The policy behind uninsured motorist coverage is simple: it is
designed to compensate the insured for bodily injury or death sustained
through the fault of an uninsured motorist.5 Application of the cover-
age has been more complex, and extensive litigation between insureds
and insurers over the interpretation and legal efficacy of policy lan-
guage has defined certain problem areas. This note will examine these
problem areas placing emphasis upon Kentucky law; however, it must
be noted that uninsured motorists coverage is relatively unlitigated
in this state.6 Where a Kentucky case has dealt with the problem,
1 Clark v. Suggs, Civil Action No. 2132 (Hardin Cir. Ct. Ky., Dec. 4, 1965).
2 Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.20-020 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3 KRS § 304.20-020(1).
4Id.
5 See, e.g., Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Craig, 328 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Ky.
1971).
97Kentucky has only nine reported cases concerning uninsured motorist cover-
age.
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the focus will be on that case; where the Court of Appeals has not
considered the issue, the focus will shift to foreign case law in an
attempt to predict the Court's resolution of the particular controversy.
Frequent reference will be made to the Standard Uninsured Motorists
Endorsement issued by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters
[hereinafter cited as Standard Endorsement] to provide contractual
language essential to discussion of the case law.7
I. BACKGROUND
To ensure compensation for accident victims, states have devel-
oped various statutory plans. Compulsory liability insurance requires
as a condition precedent to vehicle registration that the owner demon-
strate proof of minimum liability coverage.8 An unsatisfied judgment
fund financed by vehicle registration fees, assessments against insurance
companies, and collections from uninsured motorists provides limited
compensation for plaintiffs with unsatisfied judgment claims.9 The
financial responsibility law, which Kentucky has enacted,10 provides
that once a motorist is involved in an accident, his license will be
suspended unless he can prove that he has sufficient assets to satisfy
a specified judgment. Proof of assets can be satisfied by a current
liability policy of 10/20/5 or by bond in the event the driver is not
covered by insurance." This "every dog is entitled to his first bite'
policy has an effect similar to criminal sanctions. It gives the injured
party no compensation for his injuries other than the satisfaction of
seeing the state extract its pound of flesh from the torifeasor-little
consolation for the victim of a judgment-proof motorist.
Uninsured motorist coverage was -initiated to prevent this injustice.
One commentator has described it as a "form of first party insurance
designed to protect persons injured in automobile accidents from
losses which, because of the tortfeasor's lack of liability coverage,
7 Casualty Underwriters, Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, No. UM-1-4 (May
1, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Standard Endorsement]. The Standard Endorsement
is reprinted as Appendix A in A. Wmiss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVEa-
ACE (1969).' Similar language is contained in the uninsured motorist endorsement
of any liability insurance policy.
8 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STATS. §§ 20-309, 20-279.1(11) (1971).
9 See C. HALLMAN, UNSATISFIED JUDGMENT FUNDS (1968).
1oKRS § 187.290. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Supreme
Court declared Georgia's financial responsibility act unconstitutional since it de-
prived a motorist of his license without an independent inquiry to determine
whether there was a reasonable possibility that the uninsured motorist would be
adjudged liable in a judicial proceeding. Since KRS § 187.330 employs language
similar to GA. CODE ANNOT. § 92A-605 (1972), constitutional due process probably
requires an inquiry into liability/fault before suspension of a license in Kentucky.
. 11 KRS, §, 187.330. .
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would otherwise go uncompensated."' 2  The provision essentially
fictionalizes the accident, depicting the tortfeasor as if he were in-
sured according to the minimum financial responsibility requirements.
If liability is ultimately fixed on the uninsured motorist, whether by
court decision, arbitration, or by agreement between the company
and the insured, the insurer must compensate the policyholder to the
policy limits. The company then will be subrogated to the rights of
the insured against the tortfeasor. Thus the financially responsible
driver has acquired some protection against being injured by an
uninsured motorist.' 3
To fully understand the legal development of uninsured motorist
insurance, it is essential to realize that insurance companies resisted
expanding policy coverage to include this provision. The General
Assembly, responding to the need of the motoring public, imposed this
requirement on the companies. Unable to circumvent the Book-of-the-
Month-Club offer dictated by the statute ("you've got it unless you
reject it"), insurance companies have circumscribed their contractual
responsibilities with conditions precedent which make it possible for
them to avoid indemnification. To recover, the insured must establish
that: (1) the motorist was in fact uninsured; (2) the uninsured
motorist was at fault; (3) the insured's conduct was free of con-
tributory negligence; (4) the accident was the proximate cause of
injuries sustained; (5) all conditions precedent have been met, i.e.,
notice of suit, cooperation with the company's lawyers, etc.; and (6)
the accident arose out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the
uninsured motor vehicle.' 4 Insurance representatives assert that these
conditions are necessary to protect the companies from fraudulent
claims and insist that the legislatures did not intend to put the insured
in a stronger position vis-a-vis his own company than he would have
against an insured tortfeasor. Consequently, the insured who files
an uninsured motorist claim finds himself in an unexpected adversary
relationship with his own insurer, the company he had expected to
protect his interests.
The statutory language governing uninsured motorist coverage is
brief:
(1) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of in-
surance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by
law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of





the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be de-
livered ...unless coverage is provided therein or supplemented
thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in KRS
187.330(3) 'r under provisions approved by the commissioner,
for the protection of persons injured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease
including death resulting therefrom; provided that the named in-
sured shall have the right to reject in writing such coverage....
(2) For the purpose of this coverage, the term "uninsured motor
vehicle" shall subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage
be deemed to include an insured motor vehicle where the liability
insurer thereof is unable to make payment with respect to the
legal liability of its insured within the limits specified therein be-
cause of insolvency; an insured motor vehicle with respect to
which the amounts provided under .. . the insurance policy ...
are less than the limits described in KRS 187.330 (3); and an in-
sured motor vehicle to the extent that the amounts provided in the
liability coverage applicable at the time of the accident is denied
by the insurer writing the same.' 6
The statute and the policy it embodies, i.e., to protect the financially
responsible motorist, favor the insured; however, the insurer drafts
the contract cognizant of the eventuality of litigation. Where the
statutory policy and the contractual terms clash litigation will result.
Generally, courts tend to decide in favor of the policy argument,
indicative perhaps of their predilection for the underdog and reflective
of their hostility contra proferentem in adhesion contract disputes.
This theme, while seldom expressed, becomes vividly evident as one
analyzes the case decisions.
II. WHO Is AN INsUME?
A. Residents of the Same Household.
The Standard Endorsement defines the term "insured" as follows:
(a) The named insured as stated in the policy.., and any person
designated as named insured in the schedule and while residents
of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured and
relatives of either.17
The named insured is clearly covered, but disputes often arise regard-
15 KRS § 187.330(3) sets the minimum liability limits that insurance com-
panies must offer in Kentucky: ten thousand dollars because of bodily injury or
death to one person in the accident; twenty thousand because of death or injury to
two or more persons in one accident; and five thousand dollars because of property
damage sustained in any one accident [hereinafter referred to as 10/20/5 coveragel.
16 KRS § 304.20-020.
17 Standard Endorsement § H.
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ing coverage of the spouse and other members of the family who
may be covered by the omnibus clause. For example, in a recent
LaRue Circuit Court suit,'8 the controversy narrowed to whether a
daughter residing with her mother who was legally separated from
her father could be considered a resident of her father's household
and entitled to coverage under his uninsured motorist protection.
The plaintiff contended that the endorsement clearly covered the
daughter since it was entitled "Family Protection Coverage," that the
mother had only temporary custody of the daughter, that the daughter
had spent time in the father's residence, and that the trend of foreign
courts in similar fact situations was to find that coverage existed.
The case was settled prior to a ruling on the motion for summary
judgment. One might speculate that the plaintiff settled fearful that
the court might rule in favor of the express contractual terms, while
the defendant settled fearful that the court might find the phrase
"resident of the same household" ambiguous under the circumstances
and rule for the plaintiff.
There is no Kentucky case in point on the interpretation of
"residence" in an uninsured motorist context; however, there is con-
siderable foreign case law. The courts have reached opposite results
depending on whether they adopted a strict or liberal interpretation
of the phrase.
The strict standard has required the person covered by the omnibus
clause to be actually living under the same roof as the named insured.
In a Minnesota case, 19 with a fact pattern similar to the LaRue Circuit
Court case, the court said:
A husband and wife who are separated and not living together are
not members of the same household.... The son, Raleigh, except for
visits of a day or two at a time with his father in LaCrosse, lived
under his mother's roof and accordingly was a member of her
"household" and was not a member of his father's "household".
Raleigh's temporary visits of a day or two did not make him a
member of his father's "household."20
A Texas court agreed where the issue was whether a husband was
covered by his wife's uninsured motorist endorsement when they had
separated prior to the accident and were living under separate roofs:
2 1
1 8 Brown's Adm'x v. Davis, Civil Action No. 1697 (Larne Cir. Ct. Ky., Feb. 5,
1973).
19 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Casualty Underwriters, Inc., 130 F.
Supp. 56 (D. Minn. 1955).
0 Id. at 58-59.




• . . the evidence establishes the fact as a matter of law that the
plaintiff was not a resident of the same household as... his wife,
at the time of the collision resulting in his injuries, and therefore
the contract excluded coverage as to him.
22
A New York case based its decision on whether the estranged husband
and wife were living under the same roof at the time of the accident.
23
In that case, there was evidence that although husband and wife
had been separated before and after the accident, they had been
living together at the time of the accident. On appeal from summary
judgment for the insurer, the court reversed, holding that there was a
substantial question of fact as to whether the wife was "a member of
the husband's household at the time of the accident."
24
The liberal view has extended coverage to persons who are not at
all times living under the same roof as the named insured. A
Louisiana court held that a son was a resident of his father's household
and covered by the uninsured motorist endorsement even though at
the time of the accident he was temporarily residing with his mother,
who was separated from his father.25 Evidence showed that the son
spent varying amounts of time with each parent but that he did not
plan to reside permanently with the mother.2 6 The court held that it
was not necessary for the son to be under his father's roof at all times
in order to qualify as a resident of the same household. Similarly, a
Wisconsin decision affirmed denial of an insurer's motion for summary
judgment in an action where there was a legal separation and custody
of the son had been awarded to the mother.2 7 However, the father,
though living apart, testified that he considered his wife's residence
to be his legal residence, and the court concluded that, absent a final
divorce decree, the son was a resident of the same household.
28
Beyond the separation of spouses context, courts applying the
standard have ruled that coverage extends to a son away from home
at college29 and to an unemancipated son in the military.30 Coverage
was also granted to a step-daughter who did not move into her step-
father's house until after the accident because her step-father and
22 Id. at 217.
23 Highsmith v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 298 N.Y.S.
2d 648 (App. Div. 1969).
24 Id. at 650.
2 5 Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ripley, 228 So.2d 238 (La. Ct. A pp. 1969).
26 Id. There was no legal decree of separation nor had custody of the children
been awarded to either parent.
27 Herbert v. Hanson Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 176 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1970).
28 Id.
29 Manuel v. American Employers Ins. Co., 228 So.2d 321 (La. Ct. App.
1969).
30 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 88 Cal. Rptr. 593 (Ct. App. 1970).
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mother were honeymooning at the time of the accident.31 The court
reasoned that once her mother married, the step-father's home was
the daughter's legal residence.
How would the Kentucky Court of Appeals decide a case with a
fact pattern similar to the Brown case in LaRue Circuit Court?
3 2
The split in foreign decisions seems to center on each court's interpreta-
tion of "household." Courts that deny coverage equate "household"
with the actual dwelling place of the insured at the time of the
accident, while those that allow coverage interpret "household"
broadly and focus on the insured's intent to dwell apart permanently.
Although the Kentucky Court has never specifically interpreted the
phrase "resident of the same household," it has construed similar
language contained in the family exclusion clause appearing in many
liability policies. By analogy, these cases can be applied to the unin-
sured motorist context to predict how the court may interpret "resident
of the same household" in uninsured motorist cases.
In Orange v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.33 the Court of Ap-
peals upheld the insurer's claim that it was not obligated to defend a
liability suit against the insured mother by the estate of her unborn
child who died as a result of her negligence. Finding that the child
was a viable fetus, the Court ruled that the child came within the
exclusionary clause in the contract which provided that insurance
would not apply "(i) ... to bodily injury to the insured or any member
of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the
insured."34 The Court refused to go into the interpretation of "family"
and "household" but rather looked to the purpose of the family exclu-
sion clause:
We are impressed by the fact that the clear purpose of the exclu-
sion was to protect the insurer from overfriendly lawsuits, which
nearly always would exist where plaintiff and insured defendant
are bound by ties of kinship and are living together.35
The same result was reached in Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Harp3" and in a federal case applying Kentucky law,
Automobile Club Insurance Co. v. Combs.3 7 These cases involved
contractual terms within a liability policy context. The Court was not
faced with the issue of separate households and had little trouble
31 Box v. Doe, 221 So.2d 666 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
32 See text accompanying note 18, supra.
33448 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969).
34 Id. at 651.
Sr Id. at 651-52.
30 423 S.W.2d Z33 (Ky. 1968).
37299 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Ky. 1969).
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determining who lived with whom. As to emancipated children living
at home, the Court held in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Car-
ricato that a clause in a liability policy excluding "the named insured
and any resident of the same household" encompassed the insured's
emancipated daughter while living in the household of the named
insured.38 Similarly, in Senn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.,39 the Court held the exclusion clause applicable to the
brother of the insured serviceman stationed away from home on the
grounds that the serviceman's residence was not his military post but
the home he had left to enter service, and therefore his brothers were
members of the same household.
40
In other contexts, the Court has wrestled with the terms "residence"
and "household". In a voting situation, the Court held: 41
When a person retains a habitation or dwelling, intention to return
to it is a most important consideration and must oftimes be con-
trolling. On the other hand, when a person no longer has a physical
abode in a particular area his intention to return to the area is a
lesser significance.
42
In an appeal challenging venue,43 defendant contended that al-
though he was living in Kentucky at the time of the accident, he in-
tended to return to his domicile, Indiana, and that the proper venue
was either the place of the accident (Indiana) or his domicile. The
Court distinguished the two terms:
Although used interchangeably they have a separate and distinct
meaning. "Domicil" has a broader meaning than "residence." It
includes residence but actual residence is not essential to retain
a domicil after it is once acquired. Residence is preserved by an
act; domicil by an act coupled with intent. While one may have
only a single domicil, he may have several residences. Having
acquired a legal residence and domicil as contemplated by the
statute, it can only be lost or changed by the exercise of a con-
scious volition.
44
In an action to determine which city was entitled to personal
38489 S.W.2d 957 (Ky. 1969).
39 287 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1956).
40 For federal tax purposes, a serviceman's residence is his organization, see
Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1967). In effect this means that the
soldier stationed in Korea or the marine in Okinawa cannot claim the away-from-
home deductions available to a professor touring Europe ostensibly for research
purposes. Kentucky taxes its servicemen regardless of duty station as long as they
maintain their permanent residence in Kentucky. KRS § 141.215.
41 Moore v. Tiller, 409 S.W.2d 813 (Ky. 1966).
42 Id. at 816.
4 3 Vogt v. Powers' Admx, 291 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1956).
44 Id. at 842.
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property taxes,45 the Court held for the City of Catlettsburg although
decedent for the five years preceding his death had resided in Ashland:
It follows that although decedent changed his actual residence from
Catlettsburg to Ashland in 1907, he did not change his legal resi-
dence or domicile until he intended so to do, and his intention in
the final analysis is really the only question in issue, and in de-
termining this issue the party's own expressed intention cannot
have a controlling effect; where there is a conflict between his
intention as expressed and as exhibited by his conduct, the latter
will usually control.46
Analogizing from decisions in other areas of the law, the Court
of Appeals would probably hold that "household" equates with "legal
residence" or "domicile" and rule that uninsured motorist coverage
extends to the child of a separated insured father since the child is
living in the father's legal residence, following the Louisiana 47 and
Wisconsin4 decisions. In contrast, the Court could adhere to the
"strict" approach of Minnesota49 and Texas5" which consists of ex-
amining the evidence to determine who lived where. In fact, the Court
used this second approach in the liability insurance context mentioned
above.5' However, in other contexts, it has looked beyond the mere
spatial connotations of "residence" or "household." In resolving this
controversy, the Court will be faced with the dilemma of whether to
look to the policy and spirit of the statute or look to the literal terms
of the contract. If it is more persuaded by the policy argument, it can
find coverage exists; if it approves the contractual argument, it can
deny coverage. Judging from past decisions, the Kentucky Court will
tend toward the former and liberally interpret "household" to extend
coverage.
B. Occupying an Insured Highway Vehicle.
There is a second class of insureds covered by the policy, i.e., "(b)
any other person while occupying an insured highway vehicle" with
the insured's consent.52 "Occupying" is defined as ". . . in or upon or
entering into or alighting from."5 3 Questions of coverage arise in this
45 City of Ashland v. City of Catlettsburg, 189 S.W. 454 (Ky. 1916).4
6 Id. at 455.
47 Box v. Doe, 221 So.2d 666 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
48 Herbert v. Hanson Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 176 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1970).
49 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Casualty Underwriters, Inc., 130 F.
Supp. 56 (D. Minn. 1955).
0 Cunningham v. Members Mut. Ins. Co., 456 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970).
51 Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harp, 423 S.W.2d 233 (Ky. 1968).
52 Standard Endorsement § II.5 3 Standard Endorsement § V.
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area when a person is physically outside of the vehicle. Research
reveals no Kentucky case which has interpreted the term "occupying;"
however, foreign law illustrates the "entering" or "alighting" aspects
of coverage. A New York case ruled coverage extended to a claimant
injured while standing next to a taxicab as he attempted to pay the
driver,54 and a Louisiana case extended coverage to a claimant unlock-
ing the insured's car door when struck by an uninsured motorist
55
Another New York case expanded protection to include a claimant
who was injured by a hit-and-run vehicle four or five seconds after
alighting from a stalled vehicle.56 California extended coverage to an
insured when struck by an uninsured motorist while standing one to
four feet away from the vehicle preparing to install snow chains.
57
Since he had alighted from the car two minutes earlier, the plaintiff
based his case on the theory that his physical relationship to the car
was sufficient to place him within the protection offered to those who
are "upon" an insured vehicle. The California Court of Appeals held
that contractual provisions must be read and interpreted in light of
the purpose and policy of the uninsured motorist statute, which is to
provide compensation for those injured by the use of automobiles
through no fault of their own.58 A Virginia case59 denied coverage
where evidence showed decedent was 164 feet away from the insured
vehicle when struck by an uninsured motorist.
These cases point out that as long as there is a reasonable relation-
ship between the vehicle and the insured, manifested by some activity
concerning the vehicle, or the insured is within reasonable geographical
limits of the vehicle at the time of injury, the courts will extend
coverage.
Before one concludes that the Kentucky Court of Appeals would
liberally construe the term "occupying", consideration should be given
to Kentucky Water Serv. Co., Inc. v. Selective Insurance Co.6 0 Plaintiff
drove his truck onto defendant's premises for the purpose of obtaining
a load of water and, while helping defendant's servant with the hose,
was injured, allegedly because of the servants negligence. Plaintiff's
liability policy covered any person who suffered injury arising from
the use of the vehicle, which included loading or unloading, and the
omnibus clause covered any person using the automobile with per-
54 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Flaumenbaum, 308 N.Y.S.2d 447 (S. Ct. 1970).
55 Box v. Doe, 221 So.2d 666 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
56 State-Wide Ins. Co. v. Murdock, 299 N.Y.S.2d 348 (App. Div. 1969).
57 Cocking v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 193 (Ct. App.
1970).
58 Id. at 196.
59 Insurance Co. of North America v. Perry, 134 S.E.2d 418 (Va. 1964).
60 406 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1966).
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mission. Defendant's insurance company maintained that plaintiff's
insurance company should defend defendant and defendant's servant,
since the servant was "using" the vehicle and had injured plaintiff.
The Court ruled against the defendant's insurance company holding
there was not a sufficient relationship between defendant's servant
and plaintiff's vehicle to extend liability coverage under the omnibus
clause. The decision may be distinguishable in an uninsured motorist
context, but it indicates that the Court of Appeals may define the
permissible geographical perimeter narrowly and demand a close
relationship between claimant and vehicle before extending coverage.
III. Tm UNinsuRFD VEmCIL
A. The Hit-and-Run Vehicle
Having discussed who is entitled to protection as an insured, we
must determine who may be classified as an uninsured motorist. The
Standard Endorsement speaks in terms of the vehicle rather than the
person: ". . . the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle
. . " and .. . arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of
such uninsured highway vehicle."61 If the policyholder is injured by
an insured tortfeasor and for some reason, such as lack of notice, the
tortfeasor's insurer denies coverage, the policyholder can proceed
against his own carrier on the uninsured motorist provision.62 The
same is true if the wrongdoer's insurance company becomes insolvent.
6 3
If the policyholder is injured by an out-of-state motorist carrying the
minimum liability policy of 5/10/5 under that state's financial re-
sponsibility law and judgment is for $10,000, the policyholder can
recover the remaining $5,000 from his insurer since the motorist was
partially uninsured under Kentucky law.64 These situations are easily
handled by the express wording of the statute.
The hit-and-run vehicle also qualifies as an uninsured vehicle. The
Standard Endorsement defines a hit-and-run vehicle as
a vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of
physical contact of such vehicle with the insured or with a vehicle
which the insured is occupying at the time of the accident pro-
vided:
(a) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator
or owner of such highway vehicle.65
A case recently settled in Jefferson County illustrates the use of this
1 Standard Endorsement § I.
62 KRS § 304.20-020(2).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Standard Endorsement § V.
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provision.66 Plaintiff was traveling on a turnpike when he suddenly
realized he was about to rear-end a truck traveling around 30 m.p.h.
(minimum speed was 40 m.p.h.). Slamming on his brakes, he avoided
striking the truck by a few inches, only to be knocked forward into
the truck by defendant's trailing car. The truck sped off, leaving the
plaintiff and defendant to disentangle themselves. Plaintiff sued both
the defendant for rear-ending him and his insurance company on his
uninsured motorist coverage contending that it was the hit-and-run
truck's negligence that caused the chain of events leading to his
injuries.
The hit-and-run provision, like all uninsured motorist provisions,
covers the insured when injured in his own car, or as passenger in
another car, or as a pedestrian.67 The uncertainty of hit-and-run cover-
age centers on whether a "hiC, i.e., physical contact, is required.
Suppose the policyholder swerves to avoid a weaving car approaching
from the opposite direction and encroaching on his lane, loses control
and smashes into an abutment. Can he recover under the hit-and-run
provisions when in fact the only "hit" registered was the striking of the
abutment? In Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Co.68 the Florida
court did not focus on the requirement of a hit which the insurance
company argued was necessary in order to obviate spurious claims,
but rather it emphasized the public policy of the statute to entitle the
policyholder to recover the damages he would have been able to re-
ceive had the tortfeasor been located and insured. 9 Commenting on
this case, one writer summarized the effect of the decision:
The instant decision places the emphasis on proof rather than upon
relatively arbitrary requirements imposed by and for the benefit
of the insurance industry. The advantages of the court's decision
far outweigh the possible increase in spurious claims. The court
emphasized the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the ac-
cident did occur as alleged. Since the physical contact require-
ments are no longer a condition precedent of recovery, the victim
of a hit-and-run accident who has sufficient proof that there was a
68 Stem v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil Action No. 141099 (Jefferson Cir. Ct.
Ky., Mar. 30, 1973).
67 Consider this situation: plaintiff lived in a small house at a sharp bend of
a secondary road. While plaintiff was asleep one night, an unknown driver failed
to negotiate the bend, tore through the fence and smashed into his bedroom.
Amazin.ly, the driver was able to extricate his car and make good his escape.
Plaintiffs bodily injuries consisted of minor abrasions but his property damages
were extensive. However, uninsured motorist coverage only extends to bodily
injuries, so the policyholder could not recover for his property damages. See IMS
§ 304.20-020(1).
68249 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1971).
69 Id. at 430.
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negligent tortfeasor will not be refused recovery because of an
arbitrary technicality in an insurance contract.70
Kentucky's position on the issue of whether physical contact is a
condition precedent to recovery under the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment was recently clarified in Ogden v. Employers Fire Insurance
Co. 71 Plaintiffs decedent was a passenger in a car traveling on a four
lane expressway. The driver swerved to avoid colliding with another
vehicle encroaching on its lane and struck a guardrail. The encroaching
vehicle left the scene and was never identified. Since the driver and
a surviving passenger could not testify that the unidentified vehicle
had made physical contact with their vehicle, the court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant insurance company. The Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded on the grounds that there was a
triable issue of fact whether physical contact was made. However, in
dicta, the Court permitted little doubt that physical contact is re-
quired:
To qualify as a "hit and run" vehicle there must have been physical
contact with the person injured or the vehicle which he was oc-
cupying by the "phantom" vehicle or an object it struck and set in
motion. That is to say, in baseball jargon, there must be a hit
before there can be a run.72
The dicta in Ogden requires a harsh result if the policy of the
statute is to compensate persons injured as a result of the negligence
of an unidentified tortfeasor. If the driver of the vehicle causing the
accident were identified and insured, recovery would be permitted
without physical contact.73 It would seem to be within the policy of
the statute that the difference between a barely nudged sideswipe and
a near miss should not be decisive to plaintiff's case when he can prove
that the negligence of the hit-and-run driver caused the accident.
However, the dicta in Ogden indicates that the unambiguous lan-
guage of an insurance policy can prevail over the statutory policy of
compensating injured persons to deny recovery when a hit-and-run
vehicle fails to make physical contact.
B. Family Exclusion Clauses v. The Uninsured Motorists Endorsement
In drafting liability policies, insurance companies frequently in-
70 Comment, Insurance: Elimination of the Physical Contact Requirement
From Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Florida, 24 U. Fr.. L. REv. 588, 591 (1972).
71503 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1973).
72Id. at 728.
73 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Hayden, 447 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1969); Davis v. Ben-
netts Adm'r, 132 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. 1939). See also Malone v. Wright, 364 F.2d
818 (6th Cir. 1966).
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elude family exclusion clauses which deny coverage to any member
of the insured's family who is injured while a passenger in the insured's
automobile. For instance, if the father-passenger is injured in his own
insured automobile as the result of his son-driver's negligence, the
family exclusion clause would prevent the father from recovering on
the fathefs liability policy. Such family exclusion clauses were vali-
dated by the Court of Appeals in Third National Bank of Ashland v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.:74
[Tihe clear purpose of the exclusion was to protect the insurer
from over-friendly lawsuits, which nearly always would exist where
plaintiff and insured defendant are bound by ties of kinship and
are living together.7 5
Since liability coverage is precluded by the family exclusion clause,
the father may attempt to recover from his insurer under his uninsured
motorist protection, since as to him the vehicle that caused his injuries
was in fact uninsured. The policy states that the company will pay
all sums which the insured or his legal representatives would be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an unin-
sured automobile because of bodily injury sustained by the insured
caused by the accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
or use of such uninsured automobile.78
The policy of the statute is to compensate injured motorists for
damages which they would have received but for the fact the tort-
feasor was uninsured, and insurance companies must not be permitted
to avoid the statutory intent by artful drafting. Further the statute's
clear language supports this argument by defining an uninsured motor
vehicle as including an insured vehicle where the carrier refuses to pay
the judgment.77
The company could assert that the vehicle is insured even though
the coverage does not extend to the family passenger and that unin-
sured motorist coverage extends only to bodily injury caused by an
uninsured motor vehicle.78 The policyholder contracted for coverage
with the exclusion clause and should not be allowed to circumvent its
effect by creating the fiction of viewing the vehicle as uninsured.
Alternatively, if the court accepts the fiction that the vehicle is unin-
sured, the company can argue that coverage does not extend to an
uninsured automobile owned by the policyholder.
79
74 334 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1960).
75 Id. at 263.
76 Standard Endorsement § I.
77 d. at § I(b).
78 Id.
79 KRS § 804.20-020(2).
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Foreign case law has permitted a plaintiff to circumvent the harsh
result of the family exclusion clause and recover under the uninsured
motorists endorsement. In a Florida case, the plaintiff-passenger was
injured as a result of the negligence of her husband who was driving
her car. The exclusion clause effectively denied recovery under her
own liability policy; however, she argued in a direct action against the
insurance company that her husband was an uninsured motorist. The
court accepted the policy argument and ruled that the company was
liable to the wife under the uninsured motorist coverage.80
The same result was reached in Illinois by a more tortuous route.
The intermediate appellate court8' ruled in favor of the insurance
company on the grounds that "the theory of uninsured motorist cover-
age is to protect people from being injured by other drivers who have
no insurance, and, presumably over whom they have no control."82
(emphasis added). The court agreed that it might be consistent with
the objectives of uninsured motorists coverage to include this type of
situation but reasoned that it was within the province of the legislature,
not the courts, to extend the coverage. On appeal, the appellate court
was reversed. 83 The Illinois Supreme Court initially recognized the
conflict as follows:
It is clear that there is an inconsistency between the liability
coverage provision and the uninsured motorist provision of plain-
tiffs policy. On the one hand plaintiff is excluded from the liability
coverage for the driver, and on the other, the driver does not
qualify as an uninsured motorist even though there is no insurance
available. . . . [The insurance company] . . . would have us
designate the automobile as insured, even though in fact as to the
plaintiff it is uninsured.84
After stating the policy behind the statute, the court held that "[t]he
distinction that the uninsured motorist was the driver of the automobile
in which plaintiff was a passenger rather than the driver of another
automobile is not decisive."85 Therefore, the court accepted plaintiffs
fiction that as to him the vehicle was uninsured and within the cover-
age, contract terms and definitions notwithstanding.88
Kentucky has no case law on the subject, but in a federal diversity
80 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Bramnlitt, 228 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1969).8 1 Barnes v. Powell, 262 N.E.2d 334 (IMI. Ct. App. 1970), reed, 275 N.E.2d
377 (111. 1971).
82262 N.E.2d at 338.83 Barnes v. Powell, 275 N.E.2d 377 (III. 1971).
841d. at 379.




case with the court applying Kentucky law an opposite conclusion was
reached.8 7 The court agreed with plaintiff that
[i]f the most literal reading of the statute were applied in the
present case, one could logically conclude that because the
family exclusion absolves the liability insurer from coverage as to
the particular accident, the automobile is thus an uninsured motor
vehicle as defined by the statute, the language of the policy not-
withstanding.88
However, the court decided that such a reading would effectively
preclude insurance companies from protecting themselves from col-
lusive family suits and finding no such intent in the statute ruled in
favor of the company.8 9 In spite of this limited precedent it is this
writer's opinion that where the situation narrows to a conflict between
the legislative policy favoring the injured policyholder and clear con-
tractual language favoring the insurance company, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals will be more persuaded by the legislative intent. This
conviction is based upon an analysis of the Court's past decisions,
which tend to favor the injured policyholder in uninsured motorist
disputes9 ° as indicated by the Court's attitude toward "stacking" of
uninsured motorist policies.
IV. STACKING
"Stacking" is an insurance term used to describe the procedure by
which an insured recovers damages under two separate policies or
endorsements. Since the uninsured motorist endorsement is usually
restricted to 10/20 coverage, insureds with damage claims which
exceed the policy limits may seek to recover under more than one
policy, thus "stacking" compensation from one policy on top of that
from another. For example, if the plaintiff insured is injured by an
uninsured motorist while a passenger in a friend's insured automobile,
two uninsured motorist endorsements are involved. He would be
covered by the friend's uninsured motorist coverage,91 the primary
87 Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Craig, 328 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
88 Id. at 990.
89 In supporting his decision, Judge Moynahan noticed that the Kentucky
Court of Appeals had upheld an exclusionary clause in Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins.
Co. v. Harp, 423 S.W.2d 233 (Ky. 1967) while the uninsured motorist statute was in
effect. The opinion did not reveal if the policyholder carried uninsured motorist
protection. The insured may have rejected the coverage or simply failed to make
the argument.90 E.g., Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970).
91 See Standard Endorsement II. "Each of the following is an insured under
this insurance to the extent set forth below:
(b) any other person while occupying an insured highway vehicle:"
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insurance, and by the endorsement on his own liability policy.92 If his
damages total $20,000, he might attempt to recover $10,000 from each
of the policies.
To prevent stacking, the insurance industry has inserted a clause
in their policies called the "other insurance" clause:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a high-
way vehicle not owned by the named insured, this insurance shall
apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance
available to such insured and applicable to such vehicle as primary
insurance and this insurance shall then apply only in the amounts
by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the ap-
plicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
93
The company will consider itself liable only if its coverage exceeds
that of the primary insurance. Thus if the uninsured motorist coverage
under the driver's policy had a 5/10 limit and the passenger carried
10/20 coverage, the passenger could collect from his company only
$5,000, the amount by which his policy limits exceed the limits of the
driver's policy, the primary insurance. This clause has been named
the "excess-escape" clause-"escape" in that if the driver's coverage is
equal to or greater than the policyholder's, the company escapes
liability; "excess" in that the company considers itself bound only
to the extent that its policy limits exceed the driver's policy limits. 94
Since most states require minimum liability coverage of 10/20, the
"escape" is the rule, the "excess" the exception.95
A second situation in which "stacking" can occur is where the
insured owns two insured vehicles and is injured by an uninsured
motorist while driving or occupying one of them. The insured may
have two separate policies or one policy which covers both cars. In
either event, he pays premiums for uninsured motorist coverage on
both vehicles,9 6 and each endorsement covers the accident. Drafters
of insurance contracts, anticipating such stacking, inserted a second
paragraph into the "other insurance" clause which provides:
[Ilf the insured has other similar insurance available to him and
applicable to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to
exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall not
be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage
92 Id.
93 Id. § VI (E).
94A. WiDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 106 (1969).
[hereinafter cited as A. WmDiss].
05 See Id. at 310 for a list of states requiring only 5/10 minimum coverage.
90 KRS § 304.20-020.
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applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of
the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other
insurance.
97
In other words, when two policies owned by the insured are ap-
plicable to the same accident, the company will consider itself liable
for damages no greater than the higher limit of the two policies and
then only on a pro-rata basis. To illustrate, if plaintiff's damages are
$20,000 and both policies carry the minimum $10,000 coverage, then
$10,000 is the maximum that the plaintiff can recover with each
company liable for $5,000.98 This result follows regardless of whether
policies are written by the same or separate companies.
In either of the preceding situations the insurer would argue not
only that the unambiguous contractual language prohibits stacking,
but also that the legislative intent was to provide the policyholder
with the same protection he would have if he had been injured by a
financially responsible motorist carrying the minimum 10/20 policy
and not to improve the insured's position by allowing him to stack
uninsured motorist endorsements which at a nominal premium per
policy could produce a windfall.9 9 The insured, on the other hand,
would argue that he has paid premiums for the two policies and that
to prohibit him from recovering on each results in unjust enrichment
to the insurer. Further, the legislature set only minimum coverage
and did not preclude protection either beyond the minimum or double
protection. Finally uninsured motorist coverage extends to injuries
sustained in places other than the insured's vehicle, and excess cover-
age is not frowned on in those situations.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals considered these competing argu-
ments in Meridian Mutual Insurance Co. v. Siddons'0 0 where plaintiff
sought to "stack" two policies with the same company to recover a
judgment of $15,577 against an uninsured motorist. The company
relied on the "other insurance" clause as limiting its liability to
$10,000.101 The Court held that the "other insurance" clause was
97 Standard Endorsement § VI(E).98 A. Wmiss at 118-14.
99 KRS § 304.2-110 grants authorization to the Commissioner of Insurance to re-
view rates for insurance policies. Kentucky Administrative Regulations Service
1-13.01 sets forth the criteria the Commissioner will consider in setting such rates.
A check with the Commissioner's office reveals that uninsured motorist rates range
between $5 and $7 for the statutory minimum of 10/20 coverage.100 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970).
101 An interesting side issue in the case was whether plaintiff was covered by
two endorsements. The policy on his car carried the endorsement on which he paid
premims. The policy on his truck did not carry the endorsement, and plaintiff
did not pay premiums for the coverage however, he had not rejected the coverage.
The Court dismissed that technicality holding that since Siddons had not rejected
(Continued on next page)
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invalid because it conflicted with the statute and that Meridian had
furnished 20/40 coverage by virtue of underwriting two separate
policies for plaintiffs automobiles. Quickly disposing of defendant's
argument that the legislature could not have intended uninsured
motorist coverage to put the policyholder in a better position than if
he had been injured by a minimally insured motorist, the Court stated:
As we read the statute it plainly requires each policy to contain
uninsured motorist coverage of $10,000 and $20,000 (unless re-
jected in writing by the insured). The only possible ground on
which the courts could say that such is not the requirement would
be that the requirement is so unreasonable that the legislature
surely could not have intended it. We cannot say the require-
ment is unreasonable. The legislature very well, and reasonably,
could have considered that an insured who had occasion to acquire
two liability policies would benefit by having a double amount
of uninsured motorist coverage.... Meridian's counsel do not point
out to us any respect on which the statute is unreasonable; they
content themselves with arguing that the statute does not intend
what it plainly says. We are not persuaded.
102
The result is inescapable-Kentucky permits "stacking" to satisfy
judgments above the limits of the primary insurance. However, in
the future the insurance companies may convince the General Assem-
bly to amend the statute to include an "anti-stacking" clause such as
Tennessee permits. 10 3 The Tennessee legislature has validated "other
insurance" provisions that place the policyholder in no better position
than he would occupy if hit by an individual minimally insured under
that state's financial responsibility law.104
In conclusion, consider the thoughts of Professor Alan I. Widiss
of the University of Iowa, perhaps the foremost authority on uninsured
motorist coverage:
It is true as some insurers have argued that if this approach to
indemnification is adopted [i.e., stacking], an insured who is cov-
ered by more than one uninsured motorist endorsement will be
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the coverage, he was covered since the statute required coverage be provided with
each policy unless rejected. The Court was not concerned that the company had not
collected premiums for that coverage. Id. at 832, 835.
1021I at 834.
103 TENN. CODE AwN. § 56-1152 (1968).
Nothing contained in §§ 56-1148-56-1153 shall be construed as requiring
the forms of coverage ... to afford limits in excess of those that would
be afforded had the insured been involved in an accident with a motorist
who was insured under a policy of liability insurance with the minimum
limits .... Such forms of coverage may include such terms, exclusions,
limitations, conditions and offsets which are designed to avoid duplica-
tion of insurance and other benefits. Id.




better off than he would have been had he been injured by a
negligent motorist carrying the minimum coverage specified by the
financial responsibility laws. However ... [a] premium has been
paid for each endorsement and coverage has been issued. It
seems both equitable and desirable to permit recovery under more
than one endorsement until the claimant is fully indemnified.' 05
Meridian Mutual may give rise to stacking in an additional context.
Suppose an insured plaintiff secures a judgment of $20,000 against
defendant insured for $10,000, the Kentucky minimum. Could plaintiff
seek the $10,000 balance from his own uninsured motorist coverage
by arguing that as to half of his damages the motorist was uninsured?
Relying on Meridian Mutual, he could contend that whenever his total
uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the insurance limits of the tort-
feasor's policy, even though such policy conforms with the statutory
minimum, that motorist is uninsured to the extent his coverage is less
than plaintiff's uninsured motorist protection. If this argument fails,
the Court has created an anomaly whereby a plaintiff who is covered
by two or more uninsured motorist endorsements is in a better position
when injured by an uninsured motorist than when injured by a
motorist who is insured as required by the financial responsibility law.
Carried to its logical conclusion, Meridian Mutual provides the basis
for extending uninsured motorist protection to this situation.
V. LEGAL ENrimmm
So far we have considered who is covered by the uninsured
motorist endorsement, what is an uninsured vehicle, and how stacking
is used to satisfy damages for bodily injury arising from the operation,
maintenance or use of an uninsured vehicle. We now consider perhaps
the most difficult problem regarding uninsured motorist insurance:
whether the policyholder is "legally entitled" to recover for damages. 10 6
The phrase seems to connote that absent agreement or settlement by
the insurance company, the plaintiff must go to court and secure a
judgment against the uninsured motorist before the company will con-
sider him "legally entitled." However, this approach has been rejected
as the only approach for determining issues of fault and damages.
10 7
The standard endorsement provides that the issue of fault and
damages "shall be made by agreement between the insured ... and
the company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration." 08 It should be
noted that such an arbitration provision is not binding per se in
105 A. Wmiss at 112.
106 Standard Endorsement § I.
107 See generally Hickey v. Insurance Co. of North America, 289 F. Supp. 109
(E.D. Tenn. 1965).
1o Standard Endorsement § I.
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Kentucky. 09 However, the parties can provide for arbitration to settle
their personal controversy if certain statutory requirements are fol-
lowed," 0 and the arbitrator's award will be binding on them."'
Another method for resolving the dispute would be direct action
against the insurer on the contract for determination by the court of
whether a plaintiff is legally entitled to damages." 2
If the insurance company and the policyholder cannot agree, the
policyholder will often sue the uninsured motorist and then look to
the insurance company for payment of his judgment. However, ex-
press policy language creates difficulties for the insured in a suit
against the tortfeasor:
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to be
legally responsible for bodily injury shall be conclusive as be-
tween the insured and the company, of the issues of liability of
such person or organization of the amount of damages to which
the insured is legally entitled unless such judgment is entered
pursuant to an action prosecuted by the insured with the written
consent of the company."
3
In effect, the endorsement states that the company will not be
bound by any court decision in an action undertaken without its
consent. This provision is intended to prevent a default judgment or
an adverse decision emanating from a collusive suit. By requiring
notice of any action prosecuted against an uninsured motorist, the
company can defend that action against its insured to assure that its
interests are adequately represented. If the uninsured motorist rejects
the company's offer to furnish him counsel, the company may enter
the action by right of intervention." 4 In the event that the company
does not consent to the action, does not enter, and retains the right to
refuse to be bound by judgment, the insured may bring it into the
109 KRS § 304.20-050.
110 KRS §§ 417.010-.011, .020, .030. These statutory requirements reflect the
common lav reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements when a party might
unwittingly have forfeited his right to a judicial determination of the controversy.1 1 1 Parties may not by contract deprive themselves of the right to resort to
courts for settlement of their controversies; but when parties have agreed on a
method of arbitration pursuant to statutory regulation, such agreements are valid.
Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944). See also KRS § 417.040.
12 In Puckett v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 477 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1972), the Court
of Appeals ruled that an insured may sue his insurance compan a ect action
to recover under his uininsured motorist coverage without having obtained a
judgment against the uninsured motorist. If the uninsured motorist is amenable to
process, the company will im lead him for indemnification purposes. If not
amenable, the Court will not ten to the argument that the absence of the
uninsured motorist destroys its subrogation right for "[t]he policy of the statute
places the insured party's right to sue in this state above the dubious value of the
insurers right of subrogation." Id. at 814.
113 Standard Endorsement § I.
114 Ky. R. Cmv. P. 24.01.
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action through permissive joinder unless the court is persuaded such
action would prejudice the uninsured defendant or the company.1 5
The plaintiff who fails to join the company and proceeds without
its consent against the uninsured motorist is ill advised. If he loses the
suit, and then proceeds against the company in a subsequent action,
the company will argue that the previous judgment in favor of the
uninsured motorist is proof that the insured is not "legally entitled"
to recovery. Beyond that the issue is res judicata between the insured
and the uninsured motorist and should the court find for the plaintiff
in the present suit, the insurance company would have no subrogation
rights against the uninsured motorist. If plaintiff wins the initial suit
against the uninsured motorist, he may have to relitigate the case in
the subsequent action against the insurer because the insurer will
argue that its interests were not adequately represented. Most courts
would give little consideration to such an argument, since the insurance
company was put on notice and plaintiff has proven that he is legally
entitled to damages; however, problems can arise concerning the
amount of damages. In the first suit, a jury may have awarded only
$3,000 damages when plaintiff sued for $10,000.116 In the second suit,
plaintiff will seek the full $10,000 recovery from the insurance com-
pany, but the company will point to the $3,000 judgment as evidence
of the extent of damages.' 17 Further, $3,000 is the established value
of the subrogation rights, and it would be inequitable to allow a
greater recovery than the insurance company can hope to recoup. On
the other hand, if the plaintiff proceeds against the insurance company
first and loses, he still can sue the uninsured motorist in a later suit
provided that individual is not a party to the first suit.
Why should the insurance company withhold its consent? A num-
ber of valid reasons come to mind: the suit may be initiated in a
jurisdiction that allows one family member to sue another as an
uninsured motorist; a situation may arise where from all outward
circumstances it is unlikely that the uninsured motorist will appear; or
forum non conveniens in a conflicts case where the forum may apply
its own law rather than the law of the place of the wrong. In other
words, whenever the insurance company's prospects for favorable judg-
ment are reduced, consent will be withheld. However, it is the plain-
tiffs prerogative to choose his forum, not the defendant's, and the
insurance company should stand in no better position than a de-
fendant.
115 Ky. R. Civ. P. 20.01.
116 Whereas if the insurance company had been a party to the action, the
damages awarded may have been higher.
,,
7 A. Wmnss 266-67.
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Actually the "consent" requirement serves the purpose of notifying
the insurer that a suit against its interest is contemplated. If the com-
pany is given notice of a pending suit, withholds consent, and watches
plaintiff win a litigated judgment (as opposed to a default judgment),
it is doubtful that a court would uphold the company's refusal to
indemnify on the ground that "no judgment shall be conclusive with-
out consent." Notice, not consent, should be the focal point, and
notice is adequately provided for under the standard endorsement:
If before the company makes payment of loss hereunder, the in-
sured or his legal representative shall institute any legal action for
bodily injury against any person or organization legally responsible
for the use of a highway vehicle involved in the accident, a copy
of the summons and complaint or other process served in con-
nection with legal action shall be forwarded immediately to the
company by the insured or his legal representative. 118
In a Kentucky case, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Boston,119 lack of
notice was fatal to a policyholders action against her insurer following
a default judgment against an uninsured motorist. Plaintiff insured
suffered injuries when her vehicle was struck by an uninsured motorist.
She notified Allstate of the accident and promptly filed suit; however,
she did not deliver copies of the summons and complaint to the
company because at the time she was unaware that the motorist was
uninsured. Only later, after the motorist neither responded to sum-
mons nor appeared for depositions, did she notify the company that
"it is indicated from defendant's conduct that he does not have in-
surance" and that ultimately she would be seeking recovery on her
uninsured motorist coverage. Almost as an afterthought, plaintiffs
counsel mentioned he was moving for default judgment the next day!' 20
Plaintiff received a default judgment, then secured summary judgment
in circuit court for recovery from the company. The insurer appealed,
arguing that plaintiff failed to fulfill the notice requirements. Plaintiff
responded that she had no means of knowing the defendant was
uninsured since she was denied opportunity for discovery. As soon as
defendant's conduct indicated lack of coverage, she notified the com-
pany, albeit the day of the motion for default judgment. Rejecting her
argument of substantial compliance, the Court reversed the summary
judgment:
[Tihere is a patent reason why the liability carrier must be af-
forded early and ample notice that its insured has set in motion
the processes of law by bringing suit against the adverse driver
118 Standard Endorsement § VI(D).
19 439 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1969).
120 Id. at 66.
1974]
KENTUcKY LAW Joum[VAL
• ..The company is entitled to inform itself as to whether the
adverse driver is an uninsured motorist and is also entitled to full
opportunity to make such defenses against recovery by its own
insured as may be properly available. ... The prudent course is
to notify the insurer whenever action is instituted as required by
the policy.
1 21
The Boston decision raises a question: the statute provides that
when an insurance company becomes insolvent or denies coverage on
defendant's liability, the plaintiff policyholder can consider that de-
fendant an uninsured motorist. 122 If the plaintiff does not discover this
until after judgment, will his uninsured motorist claim be denied be-
cause he did not take the "prudent course" and deliver copies of the
summons and complaint to his insurance company at the beginning of
the action? The Court in Boston indicated that result when it con-
ceded plaintiffs claim as to lack of knowledge:
It is not definitely shown when Mrs. Boston first learned that Bar-
bour was an uninsured motorist. For our purposes we will assume
that she did not possess this information when the suit was filed
or when the quoted letter of Dec. 14, 1967 was written.
123
The issue of notice was framed in a summary judgment plea by
plaintiff. The Court reversed summary judgment for plaintiff and
remanded for further proceedings. Does this mean that the failure
to provide notice barred plaintiff from further pursuing her actions
against the insurance company? The Court in Boston alluded to such
a result:
The same principles which impel courts to hold that an insured
can be barred from coverage by failure to comply with policy
provisions relating to notice of actions against him are ap-
plicable in situations in which the insured files suit in his own
behalf.'
2 4
This is understandable in actions on the liability policy, but in an
action on the uninsured motorist endorsement the company can avoid
liability since it cannot be bound by a judgment in an action to which
it has not given its written consent. How is lack of notice prejudicial
in light of that clause? The Boston fact pattern is an excellent example
of a situation that would justify holding that the insurance company
is not bound by a judgment for plaintiff as conclusive of his legal
entitlement to damages. However, does that lack of notice mean that
plaintiff will be precluded from litigation on the merits by a mere
121 Id. at 67.
122 KRS § 804.20-020(2).
123 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boston, 439 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Ky. 1969).
124 Id. at 67.
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technicality? Hopefully, the policyholder did not lose her case be-
cause of lack of timely notice. Denial of summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff may have been equitable to the defendant under the
circumstances, but it would be grossly inequitable if such lack of
notice would satisfy grounds for summary judgment for the defendant.
VI. SEKrzxMErs
What has been said of prosecuting suits without consent or notice
is even more applicable to settlements. In fact, if the insurance com-
panies could prevail, any settlement without their written consent
would bar application of the coverage as indicated by the language
of the standard endorsement:
This insurance does not apply:
(a) to bodily injury to an insured. . . who shall, without written
consent of the company make any settlement with any person or
organization who may be legally liable therefore.'
2 5
If a company grants consent, its liability is reduced by the amount of
any settlement received by the policyholder:
(b) any amount payable under the terms of this insurance . . .
shall be reduced by
(1) all sums paid on account of such bodily injury by or on
behalf of
(i) the owner or operator of the uninsured highway
vehicle and
(ii) any other person or organization jointly or severally
liable together with such owner or operator for such
bodily injury.126
Thus if plaintiff, whose injuries are assessed at $15,000, settles for
$5,000 with the uninsured motorist and then seeks the remaining
$10,000 from the insurance company on his uninsured motorist endorse-
ment, he will find that the company will only admit liability for $5,000,
since the $5,000 settlement reduced its liability by that amount. The
result would be unchanged if plaintiff had recovered $5,000 from an
out-of-state motorist whose state's minimum insurance limit is 5/10.
If a plaintiff settles with the uninsured motorist without obtaining
the company's consent and then seeks the balance of his damages
from his insurer, the company can argue persuasively that the settle-
ment was prejudicial. Liability was admitted without opportunity
for it to defend, and therefore the insured should be excluded from
coverage. Alternatively, even if the plaintiff is legally entitled to
125 Standard Endorsement, § I(a).
120 Id. at § IH (b)(1).
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recover, his policy limits should be reduced by the amount of settle-
ment to prevent double recovery. The latter argument is meritorious,
for by settling for a certain sum the uninsured motorist should be con-
sidered insured for the amount of the settlement and uninsured for the
balance of the alleged damages. Thus he falls directly within the
statutory framework. 127
The company's first argument that settlement has decided liability
to its prejudice is a weak one, for the company has a policy clause
stating that no judgment of a court will be conclusive of its interests
unless prosecuted with its written consent.128 A fortiori, cannot the
same be said for a settlement without its written consent? In the
subsequent suit the issues of liability and damages vill be litigated,
so the company will have its day in court. If it wins, no liability arises.
If it loses, the damages can be reduced to the extent of the tortfeasor's
settlement. Therefore, if damages are set at $10,000 and the unin-
sured motorist had settled for $3,000, the company is liable for $7,000.
Since settlement has saved the company money, it is difficult to identify
the prejudice. The idea of the insured forfeiting his coverage for
failure to comply with a contractual term providing for "no settlement
without consent" is opposed to both the tenor of the statute and
common sense. In fact, it would seem that the company could avoid
liability completely by arguing that since plaintiff and the uninsured
motorist settled for $3,000, that amount should represent all damages,
for if the court awards damages against the insurer, plaintiff retains
no rights against the uninsured to which the company can be sub-
rogated. Clearly, the argument that settlement without consent is
prejudicial to the company is unfounded.
The situation becomes more complex where the accident involves
multiple defendants. 129 Consider the following hypothetical: plain-
tiff is a passenger in a friend's car, and both are injured by an unin-
sured motorist; each has a policy providing uninsured motorist cover-
age; plaintiff with the consent of his insurer joins the friend in suing
friend's insurance carrier and the uninsured motorist; friend's in-
surance company settles with plaintiff for $10,000 without the consent
of plaintiff's company. Plaintiff then wins a $10,000 judgment against
the uninsured motorist and seeks payment under his own policy, but
his company denies coverage because he settled with the friend's
insurance company without its written consent. 30 Thus the issue
127 KRS § 304.20-020(2).
128 Standard Endorsement § I.
129 See generally, Blizzard & Barksdale, Uninsured Motorist: Validity and
Effect of Exclusion Clause, 23 ALA. LAW. 196 (1972).
130 Standard Endorsement § I(a).
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becomes whether plaintiff is excluded from recovery of the $10,000
judgment against the uninsured motorist because he settled with the
friend's insurer without the written consent of his own insurer.,31
The plaintiff would seek to invalidate the consent provision by
showing that he is legally entitled to damages. The judgment against
the uninsured motorist settles the matter of liability of driver's in-
surance company. Further, his insurer's consent to the suit against
the uninsured motorist establishes its consent to be bound by that
judicial determination. The company, of course, would stand on the
intent and literal construction of the policy provision, i.e., to notify it
of proceedings which might prejudice its interests in a later action.
Under Virginia law, our hypothetical plaintiff could recover from
his insurer. In Guthrie v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. 32 plaintiff suffered injuries when the bus in which she was riding
collided with an uninsured motorist. After covenanting not to sue the
bus line for $12,500, she brought suit and obtained a $13,750 judgment
against the uninsured motorist. Although her settlement with the
bus line was without State Farm's consent, in the action against the
uninsured motorist she had substantially complied with all notice
requirements; however, the company did not join the suit. A previous
Virginia decision 3 3 permitted stacking so there was no question of
reduction of State Farm's coverage by the "other insurance" clause .1 4
The sole question was whether the exclusion clause, which became
operative by lack of notice of the settlement with the bus line, con-
flicted with the intent of the statute. The court held for plaintiff:
There is no need for cooperation between the insurer and the in-
sured in connection with an uninsured motorist because they are,
in effect, and practically speaking, adversaries. Therefore, except
for the establishment of liability, the only prerequisite which had
survived judicial interpretation is that service of process be served
on the insurer where suit is initiated against an uninsured. This
gives the insurer the right to file pleadings and defend the unin-
sured motorist.135
131 Since Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970) held
stacking valid in Kentucky, the settlement with driver's carrier cannot operate to
reduce defendant's coverage of $10,000. However, if plaintiff settled with the
uninsured motorist for $10,000, defendant could argue that such settlement is an
indication of the value of the case and that damages should be limited to that
amount.
132 279 F. Supp. 837 (D.S.C. 1968).
'33 Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1966).
134 Virginia's minimum limits for uninsured motorist coverage are 15/30. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 38.1-381(c), 46.1-1(8) (1970).
13 5 Guthrie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 837, 842 (D.S.C.
1968). Accord, Gulf Am. Fire and Cas. Co. v. McNeal, 154 S.E.2d 411 (Ga.
1967); Kaplan v. Phoenix and Hartford Ins. Co., 215 So.2d 893 (Fla. Ct. App.
1968). Contra, Dancy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.
Ala. 1971); LaBoue v American Employer Ins. Co., 189 So.2d 315 (La. App. 1966).
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There is no Kentucky decision in point; however, applying existing law
to the hypothetical, we can reach certain conclusions. Since Meridian
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Siddons'318 invalidated the "other insurance"
provisions of the standard endorsement, any argument by the defendant
that settlement with the friend's insurance company will reduce de-
fendant's coverage to that extent is unacceptable. Further, because
plaintiff gave notice to defendant of the suit against the uninsured
motorist, the company cannot disclaim that judgment on grounds of
prejudice, since it had an opportunity to come forward and defend its
interest. Consequently any disclaimer based on lack of consent to the
settlement in the first suit would necessarily fail, since settlement
with the primary insurance company could not prejudice plaintifFs
insurer in the judgment against the uninsured motorist which is
determinative of plaintiff's right to recover from his insurer. Consistent
with that conclusion, plaintiff could contend that such an exclusion
clause conflicts with the public policy of reducing litigation by settle-
ment, since a third party's consent would be necessary to make the
settlement.13 7
VII. BAD FAT DiL OF SETTLEmENTS
Under the standard liability provision of an automobile policy,
the insurance company agrees to defend the policyholder in any
action charging negligence in the operation of the insured automobile.
As part of this agreement the insurer reserves the right to control the
settlement or litigation of any claims that arise. The policyholder is
desirous of a settlement within the policy limits, for if litigation re-
sults in an excess judgment, he is personally liable for that excess.
The insurance company is not interested in settlement unless its in-
vestigation reveals that the settlement is in its best interests. As the
offer of settlement approaches the liability limits, the company is
more inclined to litigate. 138 When the insurance company refuses to
settle within policy limits even though liability is clear'39 and an
excess judgment results, courts have held the company liable for the
excess if they exercised "bad faith" in refusing to settle within policy
136 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970).
137 Blizzard & Barksdale, supra note 129, at 200.
138 Note, Excess Judgments and the Bad Faith Rule, 86 ALiANY L. REV. 698,
707-08 (1972).
13 9 In Andrews v. Central Sur. Co., 271 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1967), aff'd,
891 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1968), the facts showed that the insured was driving too
fast for conditions, passed unlawfully, failed to yield the right of way and was
driving under the influence when he collided with the victim who burned to death
while pinned in the wreckage of his Volkswagon.
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limits. 140 In Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. the California Supreme
Court, in addition to finding the insurance company liable for the
excess judgment, awarded the insured $25,000 for mental suffering
proximately caused by the insurer's bad faith.141
Kentucky recognizes an action by the insured against his insurer
when the insurer exercises bad faith in settlement negotiations which
results in an excess judgment. In State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co. v. MarcumM42 the company refused a reasonable offer to
settle within the $20,000 policy limit where liability was clear, and
the jury subsequently returned a verdict for $54,389. After plaintiff
attempted unsuccessfully to execute the judgment, he brought an
action against the company as "implied assignee" of the insured's
cause of action for the excess arising out of the insurer's bad faith
refusal to accept plaintiffs settlement offer. The Court held that the
insurer had exercised bad faith and allowed the plaintiff to satisfy
his judgment by proceeding against the debt owed the defendant by
his insurer.143 In a similar case, plaintiff was an explicit assignee of
the insured's cause of action, and the Court reversed summary judg-
ment for the insurance company.144
Trial lawyers have attempted to apply the bad faith settlement
argument to the uninsured motorist context; however, to this writer's
knowledge, no appellate case in point has yet arisen. The insurer
could arguably be held liable for an excess in the following situation.
Suppose plaintiff policyholder has a cause of action for $20,000
against an uninsured motorist. Served with adequate notice, the com-
pany offers to undertake the defense of the uninsured motorist. Plain-
tiff offers to settle within the policy limits which is acceptable to the
defendant, but the insurance company refuses to conclude the settle-
ment 45 even though the facts indicate a potential excess judgment.
The case is litigated, and the jury awards the plaintiff $20,000. Since
the insured could collect only $10,000 on his coverage, he could per-
suade the uninsured motorist, now his judgment debtor, to assign to
him the cause of action against the insurance company on the bad
140 Id. The estate offered to settle for $9,950 (the defendant's policy limits
were 10/20) which the insurer refused. Judgment was banded down for
$144,0001 The insurance company was found liable for the excess of $134,000.
141 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
142 420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967).
'43 Plaintiff based his action on the garnishment statute, KRS § 426.381, on
the theory that as a creditor of the insured he was attempting to garnish an in-
debtedness owed to the insured by State Farm.
144 Terrell v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1968).
145 Standard Endorsement § I(a).
1974]
KENTUcKY LAW JOxRNAL
faith settlement theory. In his action against the insurance company,
the plaintiff could argue that the company, by refusing to accept
settlement within the policy limits, exercised bad faith and thus is
liable to the uninsured motorist for the excess judgment drawing .a
comparison to Marcum.146 Both involved contracts with insurance
companies with set limits of liability; in both, the company had
absolute discretion for any settlement, the settlement offer was reason-
able considering the risks of final award and the facts, the company
rejected the settlement, and an excess judgment resulted. The major
distinction is that in the uninsured motorist case refusal to grant con-
sent for settlement benefitted the policyholder, whereas in Marcum it
harmed the policyholder. However, from the defendant's point of
view, the blocking of settlement by his own counsel, furnished by the
insurance company, resulted in an excess judgment.
The outcome will turn on whether the uninsured motorist has a
cause of action against the company. Inveighing against that result
is the fact that when insurance companies undertake the defense of
an uninsured motorist, they require the defendant to sign an agreement
wherein he releases the insurance company from liability for any
judgment in excess of the policy limits. Further, the insurer can dis-
tinguish Marcum by pointing out that while in Marcum control of
the settlement process was governed by the contract between the
insured defendant and his insurer no such contract exists between
the uninsured defendant and the company. Finally, whereas the bad
faith in Marcum resulted in harm to the policyholder, in the uninsured
motorist context the policyholder has benefitted.
Bad faith settlements may arise in another context. After an
accident with an uninsured motorist, suppose the insured contracts a
lawyer for $200 to prepare the papers in order to recover the full
amount of the policy (the facts warrant recovery in excess of the
policy limits). The company refuses to settle, and the insured files
suit against the company and recovers a judgment for $10,000. Since
the company's refusal to settle resulted in litigation, the plaintiff must
pay part of the award in attorney fees, usually assessed on a contingent
fee basis. In a subsequent action, the policyholder could argue that
the insurance company's bad faith rejection of a reasonable settlement
has cost him financial loss. The distinction that in Marcum the bad
faith resulted in an excess judgment whereas in this case it resulted
in increased attorney's fees should not be decisive. The focus should
be on the company's bad faith manipulation of the settlement pro-
146 StateFarm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967).
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cess. 47 Once again research does not reveal a case where the argument
has been advanced, but the analogy to Marcum is arguable.
Perhaps the attempt to analogize Marcum to the uninsured
motorist field is not sound. However, one thing is clear-a bad faith
refusal to settle which causes foreseeable hardship to one's client
should provide a cause of action for the injured client. If that client
has a cause of action against the insurance company for the excess
judgment, he certainly can assign it to his judgment creditor.148
Finding the correct theory upon which to base the uninsured motorist's
cause of action presents the problem.
VIII. PnocnrnuAL MANEuvuNs ix UNsuRED MOTOmsT LrnGATION
Litigation arising out of multivehicular accidents involving unin-
sured motorists may result in the insurance company simultaneously
defending its insured on a liability claim and defending against the
insured on his uninsured motorist claim. Consider the ramifications
of an accident which occurs when an insured, traveling at high speed,
brakes to avoid rear-ending a slow-moving truck and is struck from
behind by a car whose driver is uninsured but whose passenger is
insured. In the resulting litigation, the passenger of the following
car (car #2) sues his driver (car #2) and the policyholder (car
#1) as joint torifeasors. The policyholder in turn files a cross claim
against the driver of car #2 and a third party complaint against his
insurance company, because both the driver of car #2 and the truck
driver are uninsured according to policy terms.149 The driver of car
#2 counterclaims against the policyholder. At this point, a diagram
is required to clarify the facts:
Complaint:
Passenger (car #2) v. Policyholder (car #1) and unin-
sured driver (car #2).
Cross Claim:
Policyholder (car #1) v. Uninsured Driver (car #2) and
Insurance Company.
Counterclaim:
Uninsured Driver (car #2) v. Policyholder (car #1).
Now, observe the insurance company's action: (1) it answers the
passenger's complaint based on its contractual duty to defend the
147 Barbagelata, Liabilities Arising From Insurer's Refusal to Settle Public
Liability and Uninsured Motorist Claims, 3 U.S.F.L. REv. 33, 46-47 (1968).
148 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967).
149 Standard Endorsement § VI(A).
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policyholder against liability claims; (2) it answers the policyholders
complaint against the hit-and-run truck and the uninsured driver of
the second car whose defense it has assumed; (3) it replies to the
counterclaim of the uninsured motorist based on its obligation to
defend the policyholder; (4) it cross claims against the uninsured
motorist for indemnity in the event he is found negligent (in which
case the company must satisfy the judgment to its policyholder); (5)
finally, it cross claims against the uninsured motorist for contribution
in the event both the hit-and-run truck and the uninsured motorist
are found negligent. Therefore, the company is both defending the
policyholder against his adversaries and attacking him by representing
his adversaries. Even the most naive policyholder might suspect that
there is a double agent in his camp. A finding that the policyholder
was contributorily negligent would enable the company to escape
liability under the uninsured motorist coverage. On the other hand,
it would be required to pay a percentage of the judgment if its policy-
holder contributed to the passenger's injuries. A vigorous defense
of its liability for damages might result in a verdict of lesser damages
than the driver of car #2.150 For example, if the passenger (car #2),
the policyholder (car #1), and the uninsured driver (car #2) each
seek $10,000 damages and if the court finds the policyholder negligent,
the insurance company will be liable for $20,000, i.e., $10,000 to the
passenger and $10,000 to the uninsured driver. If the uninsured
motorist is found negligent, the company pays only $10,000, i.e., to
the policyholder on the uninsured motorist coverage. If both the
uninsured motorist and the policyholder are found negligent, the
company will only pay a portion of the judgment, i.e., to the passenger
under the policyholder's liability coverage. Since the policyholder
was "rear-ended" by the uninsured motorist, a jury might find that the
policyholder is liable for 20% of the damages while the uninsured
motorist is liable for 80%; therefore, the company would be liable for
$2,000. Thus its strategy at trial would be to have its insured found
jointly negligent with the uninsured motorist with the policyholders
share of the damages assessed at the smallest possible amount.
Less complex is the situation where a policyholder, having taken
no action against the uninsured motorist, proceeds directly against
the company to recover for injuries received in an accident with an
uninsured motorist. Under the terms of the standard endorsement,
150 See Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 595 (Ky. 1968); Lexington Coun-
try Club v. Stevenson, 390 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Ky. 1965).
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the insurance company can require the policy holder to join the unin-
sured motorist as a defendant:
After notice of claim under this insurance, the company may require
the insured to take such action as may be necessary or appropriate
to preserve his right to recover damages from any person or
organization alleged to be legally responsible for the bodily in-
jury; and in any action against the company may require the in-
sured to join such party or organization as a party defendant. 51
Once the uninsured motorist is joined, the company undertakes his
defense and files a counterclaim. Standing on its right to defend the
policyholder against claims for liability, the company acquires an
interest in the plaintiff's cause by asserting that right.
In this context the most favorable result for the insurance company
is for both the insured and the uninsured motorist to be adjudged
negligent and/or contributorily negligent, thereby precluding re-
covery by either party... Similarly the insurer's interests may be
influenced by the amount of damages sustained by the parties.
To illustrate, assume that the insured has actually sustained dam-
ages of $20,000, while the uninsured motorist's is only $2,000.
In this situation, if negligence is to be allocated exclusively to
one of the parties, the company will be interested in a finding
that the insured was the negligent driver, thereby limiting the
company's liability to $2,000.152
Policyholders who perceive this problem have sought to prevent this
"dogfall" 53 result. There are two approaches, the Texas approach
and the Kentucky approach.
The Texas approach removes the company from the defense of the
uninsured motorist. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hunt,'54 the company
agreed to be bound by the policyholders suit against the uninsured
motorist. Plaintiff amended his pleading to join the company as a
defendant, and the company in turn moved either for suppression of
its name or for a separate trial. The court granted the latter. Then
the company assumed the defense of the uninsured motorist. The
trial court refused to permit the company to defend the uninsured
motorist, and the appellate court affirmed holding that the company's
defense of the uninsured motorist would be in direct conflict with
the fiduciary obligations the company owes its policyholder. This
'51 Standard Endorsement § V(C).
' 52 A. Wmiss 257.
153 Term coined by trial lawyers to describe the situation where the company
by its courtroom defense of both parties secures a verdict of negligence and
contributory negligence thereby enabling it to escape all liability.
154 469 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1971).
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obligation arises from the duty of the company to defend the policy-
holder and the policyholder's duty to cooperate by submitting to
medical exams, tendering accident reports, and in general disclosing
all information relevant to the accident. The Court believed that
such cooperation would make available to the company confidential
information which could be used to undermine the policyholder's posi-
tion were the company to defend his adversary.1 5 As one commentator
put it:
When the insurance company asserts a right to defend an unin-
sured motorist against its insured, serious ethical problems arise.
The canons of ethics of the legal profession prohibit lawyers from
representing their clients' adversaries, especially when the client
has made confidential disclosures to the attorney.156
The Texas approach of removing the insurance company from the
defense of the uninsured motorist appears to present a logical solution
to the conflict of interest problem.157 However, this approach is based
upon the erroneous premise that the uninsured motorist will assert a
vigorous defense to the action which will protect the insurer's position.
Frequently, since the uninsured motorist will be judgment proof, a
default judgment is probable. Therefore the insurer's liability on the
endorsement will be determined by the judgment against the unin-
sured motorist thus denying to the company the right to protect its
financial interest.
The Kentucky approach is illustrated by O'Bryan v. Leibsonl's
where plaintiff found that when the uninsured motorist counterclaimed
the insurance company was represented by the same lawyer on both
sides of the litigation. Plaintiff, through her own attorney, moved to
strike the company lawyer as an attorney of record for her and to
excuse her from further cooperating with her company. 59 The circuit
judge granted plaintiff's motion, and the company subsequently ap-
plied to the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition. Justice Neikirk
commented on the company's position on both sides of the litigation:
A quick survey of the battlefield, as arrayed at this point, would
convince even the unsuspecting that Motorists Mutual would shoot
away to prove both sides negligent. Motorists Mutual would escape
liability, emerge victorious, and leave the litigants to silently steal
away to salve their wounds.'6 0
155 Id. at 153.
156 Note, Conflicts of Interest Prevents Insurer from Defending an Uninsured
Motorist in an Action for the Insured, 50 TEx. L. REv. 146, 153 (1971).
157 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 469 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1971).
158 446 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1969).
'59 See Standard Endorsement § V(C).
16 0 O'Bryan v. Leibson, 446 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Ky. 1969).
[Vol. 62
THE UNNsuaxn MOTORIST iN KENTUCKY
The Court held that even though the contract gave the company the
right to defend against counterclaims, "the conflict of interest posed
overrides this responsibility."161 Explaining its ruling, the Court stated
that it was against public policy and the nature of adversary proceed-
ings for one person to control both sides of the litigation and that
"[g]ood conscience and fair dealing require that an insurance com-
pany not pursue a course advantageous to itself while disadvantageous
to its policyholder."
162
Thus the Kentucky approach is to remove the company's counsel
from plaintiffs defense and excuse the plaintiff from further cooperation
with the company. This approach is sensible, since the plaintiff must
overcome the allegations of negligence or contributory negligence in
the counterclaim in order to recover. Thus, the company's interest in
protecting its liability contract are adequately represented by plaintiffs
staunch defense against such claims. However, if the insured is
adjudged negligent, he may not present an equally vigorous defense
on the issue of damages other than to make certain that they do not
exceed his policy limits. It is here that the company acquires an
interest in the defense. A possible solution offered by Professor Widiss
is to bifurcate the trial with the first stage determining liability and
the second damages. This allows the company to intervene on the
plaintiff's side after he is found negligent, and the company's interest
in damages becomes paramount to that of the policyholder.168
IX. REvEALIG THE INSUREs INTEREST IN COURT
In the Texas case, the company moved to have its name concealed
from the jury or, in the alternative, for a separate trial. The court
granted the latter. In a Kentucky case, Wheeler v. Creekmore,6 4
plaintiff sued an uninsured motorist for damages resulting from an
auto accident and joined her insurer as a defendant. She sought to
disclose the identification of the company to the jury because, in the
words of her attorney, "we think the jury should know who he is and
what his interest is, and inquire whether the jurors have any financial
interest or other connection or association with that company."' 65 The
trial court denied her motion, and she appealed. The Court of Appeals
reversed:
The insurance company was in fact a party ... because it had a
direct contractual obligation to Mrs. Wheeler .... Since the com-
161 Id.
162 Id. at 645.
163 A. Wmiss 280.
164 469 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1971).
165 Id. at 562.
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pany was a party and was actively represented by counsel we think
the jury was entitled to know that fact and to have the company's
counsel identified. . . . It is our opinion that the considerations
which have prompted the rule against mention of ordinary
liability insurance in an automobile negligence case must yield
in uninsured motorist cases to the procedural desirability of letting
the jury know who are the parties to the litigation where the unin-
sured motorist carrier elects to participate actively in the trial.166
Justice Osborne's concurring opinion went further-he would extend
the holding in Wheeler to all indemnity policies rather than limiting
it to uninsured motorist cases:
There is no other instance in the law of which I have knowledge
that permits the real party in interest to an action to remain
anonymous. For the life of me, I cannot see why this right should
be accorded insurance companies. I believe the time is at hand
when we should lay the interests of all parties on the board for
the jury to see and consider.'
67
With the decision in Wheeler the identity of the lawyer representing
the company can be revealed to the jury in uninsured motorist litiga-
tion. In some cases, this may work to plaintiffs disadvantage. Consider
a multivehicular accident which results in the policyholder suing an
insured motorist and his own insurance company in lieu of the unin-
sured motorist. Since the court held in Lexington Country Club v.
Stevenson' 68 that juries may return verdicts against codefendants
assessing their contribution to the judgment,169 a jury may be pre-
disposed to find the insurance company more at fault than the in-
sured motorist. Suppose the jury awarded damages for $20,000, with
the insurance company liable for 75% ($15,000) and the insured
motorist liable for 25% ($5,000). If the policy limits were $10,000, the
plaintiff would be unable to recover $5,000 of his judgment. To
obviate this result, plaintiff could move to introduce evidence of the
policy limits as did the plaintiff in Wheeler. There, the motion was
denied, and plaintiff appealed. Although the Court did not expressly
reach this issue, Justice Osborne in his concurring opinion interpreted
the majority opinion as permitting plaintiff to disclose to the jury the
extent of insurance coverage.
70
X. STATUTE OF LImITATIONS
Another source of conflict is the issue of whether an unin ured
166 Id. at 562.
167 Id. at 564-65.
168 390 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1965).
169 Id. at 143.
170 Wheeler v. Creekmore, 469 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Ky. 1971).
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motorist action sounds in tort or in contract. If in tort, the one year
statute of limitations applies;171 if in contract, the fifteen year period
applies since the policy is a written contract.172
In arguing that uninsured motorist claims sound in tort, the in-
surance industry reasons that: (1) since the time limit for filing suit
against the uninsured motorist has expired, so too has the insured's
claim against the company since he cannot be "legally entitled" to
recover from the uninsured motorist, and the company is not obligated
to indemnify; (2) since the insured's cause of action and the in-
surer's subrogation right are grounded on defendant's tort, the tort
statute of limitations should apply; (3) should the insured be allowed
to recover from the insurer after the tort statute has run, the insurer
can not assert its subrogation rights against the uninsured motorist
73
On the other hand, the policyholder, asserting the applicability
of the contract action statute of limitations, may argue: (1) an action
against the insurer is grounded solely on contractual rights and the
terms of the contract, not on the duty to refrain from injuring
another; (2) the tort statute of limitations is a personal defense to
the torifeasor and cannot be extended to the insurer, who does not
stand in the shoes of the uninsured motorist; (3) "legally entitled"
means only that the insured had a cause of action at one time against
an uninsured motorist; (4) since the uninsured motorist is probably
not financially responsible, the insurer's subrogation rights are prob-
ably worthless, and it would be unjust to bar operation of the coverage
solely because the insurer would lose its subrogation rights to the tort
statute of limitations. 74
The arguments on both sides are persuasive. Kentucky has not
yet resolved the issue, but since Wheeler v. Creekmore175 placed so
much emphasis on the contractual relationship between the insurance
company and its insured, an attorney should consider framing his
arguments in light of that opinion. In most jurisdictions where the
issue has been litigated, the courts have applied the contract statute of
limitations. 76
171 KRS § 413.140.
172 KRS § 413.090.
173 Symposium: Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, supra note 12, at 338.
'74 Id. at 339.
175 469 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Ky. 1971).
'
7 6 See e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Holada, 262 N.E.2d 359 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1970)- Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 218 So.2d 580 (La. 1968);
Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963);
Schulz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 244 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1968); Lessard v. New Hamp-
shire Ins. Co., 258 A.2d 793 (R.I. 1969); Shaloff v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 171




Nothing is as simple as it seems in uninsured motorist litigation.
When litigation arises, the insured normally argues the policy of the
statute; in defending, the company points to the express terms of the
contract. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has been more persuaded
by the policy argument except in those instances where the company
can show that its interests have been clearly prejudiced by the failure
of the insured to comply with a contractual provision. Much of the
impact of the Court's decisions has been procedural, i.e., revealing
the identity of the insurance company to the jury, removing the com-
pany lawyer from the plaintiff's case when the uninsured motorist
counterclaims, and allowing a direct action against the insurance com-
pany without a prior judgment against the uninsured motorist. The
Court has interpreted the policy behind the statute broadly in favor
of the insured-broadly enough to amount to interstitial legislation
in the case of "stacking". Yet to be resolved is whether the Court
will construe the statute broadly on such substantive questions as
the family-exclusion issue, the identification of an insured, and the
bad faith settlement arguments. Despite the few decisions handed
down by the Kentucky Court there is a definite trend to favor the
insured by following the statutory policy of compensating the policy-
holder for injuries received through the fault of an uninsured motorist.
Thomas M. Cooper
Editor's Note: As this issue went to final printing, a trial lawyer
directed the author's attention to Allen v. West American Insurance
Company, 467 S.W.2d 123 (Ky. 1971), which held that an insured
cannot sue his insurer on an uninsured motorist theory when his
injury is beyond the liability coverage of his policy because of a
valid exclusion clause. This case should be included in III. B. Family
Exclusion Clauses v. The Uninsured Motorists Endorsement in the
text accompanying footnotes 87-90.
